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Abstract 
Inter-Vehicular Communications (IVC) are a cornerstone of the future intelligent 
transportation systems. A crucial enabling component of IVC is its security and privacy. 
Indeed, as vehicular computing systems become interconnected, there will be new venues for 
attackers to exploit system vulnerabilities. In addition, proper security mechanisms can assist 
in law enforcement and automate payment operations, such as toll collection. Leveraging on 
experience gained from other networks like the Internet or wireless LANs, system security for 
vehicular networks has to be introduced in the design phase. In the following sections, we 
outline several security threats encountered in IVC, then we present the obstacles needed to 
overcome in order to cope with these threats. Finally, we describe several tools that will be 
helpful in building secure IVC networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the big improvements in road safety in the last decade, fatalities in Switzerland 
caused by road traffic accidents still accounted for 546 persons in 2003 [8]. The quest for 
better safety is still ongoing, relying on technologies, such as electronic car safety systems, 
better road equipment, and radio traffic information. Recently, a new major player has joined 
the team, namely Inter-Vehicle Communications (IVC) and Roadside-to-Vehicle 
Communications (RVC) [3, 12, 16]. Using wireless radio technologies that mainly rely on the 
popular IEEE 802.11 [7] standard for wireless networks, IVC technology researchers and 
developers are set up for enabling vehicles to talk to each other, sometimes aided by roadside 
infrastructure. The benefits are multifold and the applications are numerous. The DSRC1 
tutorial [1] lists around forty applications, including cooperative driving, collision avoidance, 
traffic information, vehicle diagnostics, toll collection, and entertainment. And although the 
dream of fully autonomous cars is still futuristic, self-organized networks of vehicles will be a 
reality soon.   
Yet, by introducing more intelligence and complexity in vehicles, major responsibilities will 
arise, not only from the safety point-of-view but also the security aspect. In fact, wireless 
communications have always been prone to higher security threats than their wired 
counterparts. And given the high reliability required of IVC and the large amount of potential 
financial transactions (e.g., toll collection), IVC will soon be the target of malicious users. 
Hence comes the need for a high level of security that can cope will all kinds of existing and 
future attacks on wireless networks.  
Despite these important stakes, the security of vehicular networks has not been sufficiently 
addressed in any related ongoing projects. It seems that there is a risk of the common and 
flawed practice of introducing security only after deployment slowly taking place in IVC. To 
address this problem, in this paper we highlight the main security issues in IVC by describing 
the related challenges and the imposing threats. In addition, we provide a set of security tools 
and services that can be the bricks for building robust security architecture for IVC. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work; Section 3 describes 
several security attacks on IVC; Section 4 lists the challenges to be overcome in order to 
provide IVC security; Section 5 introduces the security toolbox that can be used to counter the 
some of the previously described attacks; and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
                                                 
1 DSRC stands for “Dedicated Short Range Communications” and is the draft standard for vehicular 
communications. 
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2. Related work 
The work on IVC has started several years ago in both academic institutions and industrial 
reasearch labs. Yet security has been almost left out of these efforts so far, especially by 
industrial projects, following the common practice of introducing it only after the initial 
products become subjected to security threats. Recently, some academic research teams have 
started addressing this subject, although existing work is still highly theoretical and does not 
specify concrete solutions.  
The most prominent articles on this subject are [9], [15], and [22]. In [9], the authors describe 
a security architecture for vehicular communications intended mainly to counter the so-called 
“intelligent collisions” (meaning that they are intentionally caused) by using an infrastructure 
of digital signatures2. But this is only one type of attacks and building the security architecture 
requires awareness of as many potential threats as possible. The authors of [15] take a 
different perspective of IVC security and focus on privacy and secure positioning issues. They 
point the importance of the tradeoff between liability and anonymity and also introduce 
Electronic License Plates (ELP), unique electronic identities for vehicles. The work in [22] 
describes an infrastructure  for vehicular communications and briefly mentions some related 
security issues and possible solutions. None of these works provides a global view of IVC 
security that includes the threat model, the constraints, and the available solutions.      
Other works tackle very specific subjects in IVC such as the use of digital signatures for 
vehicular communications [13], or the detection of erroneous data [14]. A software 
framework for mobile commerce security in IVC is proposed in [10]. 
In parallel with the academic efforts, industry has also contributed to the definition and 
fulfillment of security needs in vehicular communications. The most important work is carried 
out by the industrial consortium that launched DSRC in the context of the IEEE P1556 
Working Group (Security and Privacy of Vehicle and Roadside Communications including 
Smart Card Communications). Yet the results of this working group are not publicly 
available.   
                                                 
2 In communication security, digital signatures, the cryptographic equivalent of hand-written signatures, are used 
to verify the identity of the message signer.  
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3. Threats 
Before proposing security solutions for IVC, it is important to construct a threat model able to 
encompass all possible attacks on vehicular networks. In addition, describing specific attacks 
on these networks would enable security designers to choose the right minimum set of tools in 
order to counter these attacks. We categorize security threats into three groups according to 
the application type that they target: 
1. Attacks on safety-related applications: safety-related applications [20, 21] are the 
major incentive behind the development of IVC. As they are required to provide a 
high level of liability, their security should be no less important. The results of an 
attack on these applications can be not only annoying (e.g., causing traffic 
congestion) but also disastrous leading to accidents and losses of lives. 
2. Attacks on payment-based applications: a considerable number of IVC 
applications will involve financial transactions, e.g., for toll collection, payment for 
location-based services, and insurance. This will inevitably create a set of 
corresponding financial frauds that leverage on the open nature of wireless 
communications.  
3. Attacks on privacy: one of the major concerns in future vehicular networks is the 
question of privacy. In fact, enabling vehicles to communicate with each other will 
allow tracking their drivers. This would create a Big Brother phenomenon over a 
large scale. 
Figure 1: Bogus information attack 
 
4 
Swiss Transport Research Conference 
________________________________________________________________________________March 9-11, 2005 
3.1 Specific attacks   
In this section we describe several example attacks on vehicular networks. 
1. Bogus information attack: In this case, the attacker disseminates false information 
in the vehicular network in order to affect the decisions of other drivers. For example, 
as Figure 1 shows, several drivers may collude in order to help each other arrive to 
their destinations faster. Vehicle A2 sends messages indicating to all following 
vehicles that the road they are taking is congested after a short distance. As a result, 
the drivers of these vehicles may change their routes in order to avoid congestion by 
following different roads. The result is that the road is freed in front of vehicle A1 
that can go faster. Although this example attack is rational, the same mechanism can 
be used to create congestions on specific roads for malicious reasons. This attack 
belongs to the first category of threats. 
Figure 2: Disruption of network operation attack 
SLOW 
DOWN
The way 
is clear
2. Disruption of network operation: the aim of this attack is to prevent the network 
from carrying out safety-related functions. There are many ways to perform this 
attack, either by sending messages that would lead to improper results or by jamming 
the wireless channel (this is called a Denial of Service, or DoS, attack) so that 
vehicles cannot exchange safety messages. The example in Figure 2 illustrates the 
first case: a malicious attacker sends contradictory messages to two vehicles, one 
behind the other, during a night drive. As one vehicle receives a message warning it 
of congestion ahead and slows down, the following vehicle receives a message saying 
that the road ahead is clear and hence it speeds up. The worst-case scenario is when 
an accident results because of this manipulation. The DoS attack consists in jamming 
the wireless channel thus interrupting all communications. It can be used against both 
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safety-related and payment-based applications and is one of the hardest security 
problems in IVC. 
Figure 3: Cheating attack 
I was not 
there!
3. Cheating with identity, speed, or positioning information: in cases where liability 
is involved, drivers may be tempted to cheat with some information that can 
determine the location of their car at a given time. For example, as Figure 3 
illustrates, a vehicle may be involved in an accident and then claim that it was not on 
the spot when the accident happened. This can be done by tweaking the reported 
speed or location information. Although this example applied to safety-related 
applications, cheating with identity by impersonation can also be very useful in 
attacks on payment-based applications. 
Figure 4: Identity disclosure attack 
X
Y
Bob
Alice
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4. Identity disclosure attack: this is the Big Brother scenario, where a global observer 
can monitor trajectories of targeted vehicles and use this data for a range of purposes 
(e.g., the way freight companies track their trucks). To monitor, the global observer 
can leverage on the roadside infrastructure or the vehicles around its target (e.g., by 
using a virus that infects neighbors of the target and collects the required data!). The 
attacker can be only passive in this case (listening to the wireless transmissions of 
surrounding vehicles as Figure 4 shows), thus making the attack impossible to detect. 
We assume that the attacker does not make use of cameras, physical pursuit, or 
onboard tracking devices to track his target; otherwise, the tracking problem becomes 
simpler but also more expensive and tied to few specific targets, and it can be done 
anyhow based on existing license plates. This attack exemplifies the last category of 
threats.   
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4. Challenges 
The provision of robust security for vehicular networks must overcome a set of technical, 
economic, and social challenges, which we overview in this section.  
4.1 Network scale and dynamics 
Vehicular networks will be the largest real-life instance of self-organized ad hoc networks. Its 
size will be in millions of nodes, distributed among different authorities and services 
providers. Problems of scalability and seamless interoperability should be solved in a way 
transparent to the driver, especially that most operations are performed on-the-fly while the 
vehicles are moving at high speeds. This brings the challenge of mobility into the picture, as 
vehicles will not be able to participate in long-term security protocols because of the high 
dynamicity of the network (e.g., two cars crossing each other on the highway have only few 
seconds to exchange, mainly safety-related, information). 
4.2 Privacy 
One of the major consumer concerns about the IVC technology is its potential influence on 
privacy. Attack 4 shows how privacy can be hijacked without the victim even knowing that. 
Although there are solutions that can provide vehicle and driver anonymity, this may 
negatively affect the liability of the network. In fact, if vehicles are totally anonymous, those 
involved in an accident and fleeing the scene may not be easily identified. Hence, a balance 
should be kept between the privacy and liability of drivers. One way to do that is to allow law 
enforcement authorities to uncover the identities of some vehicles only after getting the 
permission of a court. 
4.3 Trust 
A key element in a security system is trust. This is particularly emphasized in vehicular 
networks because of the high liability required from safety applications and consequently the 
vehicles running these applications. Due to the large number of independent network 
members (i.e., they do not belong to the same organization) and the presence of the human 
factor, it is highly probable that misbehavior will arise. In addition, consumers are becoming 
increasingly concerned about their privacy. Drivers do not make an exception, especially 
because the lack of privacy and the related potential of tracking may result in high financial 
charges on the drivers (e.g., due to occasional over speeding). As a result, the level of trust in 
vehicles as well as service provider base stations will be low. Beside drivers and service 
providers, there will be a considerable presence of governmental authorities in IVC. But due 
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to the reasons stated above, trust in these authorities will only be partial (e.g., a given police 
officer may abuse his authority if given full trust).   
4.4 Cost 
Cost is another inhibitive factor in the deployment of IVC solutions. In fact, the introduction 
of new communication standards, such as DSRC, for vehicular communications will require 
manufacturers to install new hardware modules on all vehicles, thus increasing the unit cost 
for consumers. Another costly addition will be the infrastructure that will allow vehicles, e.g., 
to access online authorities as part of security services, such as authentication. These costs 
should be minimized keeping sufficient support for vehicular networks applications.  
4.5 Gradual deployment 
The time span of IVC deployment until it reaches considerable penetration is around a decade 
[18]. This means that only a small proportion of vehicles will contain the enhanced features of 
IVC over the next couple of years. Yet, this functionality should still be supported despite the 
low penetration rate. This also applied to security services where, for example, protocols 
should be performed without the widespread existence of roadside infrastructure. This means 
that vehicles should be able to carry out most of the security functions autonomously. 
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5. Security toolbox 
We have selected a set of existing and new security tools that can potentially cope with the 
threats described in Section 3 and overcome the challenges presented in Section 4. Hereafter 
are the major elements of this toolbox. 
5.1 Electronic License Plates 
Electronic License Plates (ELPs) [15] are unique cryptographically verifiable numbers that 
will be used as equivalents of traditional license plates. The advantage of ELPs is that they 
will automate the paper-based document checkup of vehicles. It will also allow the detection 
of stolen cars. ELPs will be used to identify vehicles, for example, when crossing country 
borders or during the annual technical checkup. ELPs may be issued by governmental 
transportation authorities, although an ELP should be also valid outside its country of 
issuance. Typically, an ELP will be accompanied by a digital signature of the issuing 
authority that certifies its validity. Hence, authorities should have cross-certification 
agreements that will allow them to verify the ELPs issued by the other authorities.    
5.2 Vehicular PKI 
A PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) is the typical security architecture used for networks where 
the presence of online authorities is not always guaranteed. Given the properties of large scale 
and initially low penetration of vehicular communications infrastructure, a Vehicular PKI is a 
good choice for enabling IVC security. In a VPKI, each vehicle will be equipped with one or 
more private/public key pairs certified by a Certification Authority (CA), whereby a message 
sender will use the private key is used mainly to generate digital signatures on messages that 
need to be certified and the message receiver will use the corresponding public key to verify 
the validity of the message. Although this architecture seems very convenient for vehicular 
networks, some problems still exist. One of them is key distribution, which allows message 
receivers to obtain the public keys of message senders. Another problem is certificate 
revocation, by which a CA invalidates some private/public key pairs due, for example, to their 
discovery by an attacker. A third problem of PKI is increased overhead, especially in terms of 
digital signature sizes and the accompanying signature generation, verification and 
transmission delays, although this is alleviated by the fact that onboard computers and 
communication facilities in vehicles will be powerful enough to handle this overhead. The 
comparison of several existing digital signature algorithms (RSA Sign [6], ECDSA [2], and 
NTRUSign [5]) in [17] shows that some of them are promising (ECDSA due to its small 
signature size and NTRUSign due to its fast signature generation and verification) for use in 
vehicular networks. 
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5.3 Event Data Recording 
Similar to the black boxes on airplanes, Event Data Recorders (EDRs) will be used in vehicles 
to register all important parameters, especially during abnormal situations, such as accidents. 
This data can be later used for crash reconstruction and the distribution of responsibility on 
the involved drivers. Recently, some insurance companies have equipped their customer 
vehicles with such EDRs to collect information related to driving habits, such as average 
speed and number of driving hours, and consequently compute the insurance costs [4].   
5.4 Tamper-proof hardware 
Vehicles will store cryptographic material such as ELPs and VPKI private/public keys in 
tamper-proof hardware that will keep this material safe from attackers, thus decreasing the 
possibility of information leakage. This is further motivated by the fact that car electronics are 
inevitably vulnerable to attacks, especially the data buses responsible for transferring 
information and control commands between the different electronic components of a vehicle. 
The tamper-proof box will take care of signing and verifying messages so that they cannot be 
altered even if the data buses are hacked.      
5.5 Data correlation 
Contrary to some attacks that can be detected, like the DoS attacks, the bogus information 
attack cannot be easily discovered as it relies on sending false but seemingly valid messages. 
The solution to this problem can be in using data correlation techniques that will collect data 
received from different sources and thus allowing the vehicle to make a decision on the level 
of credibility, consistency, and relevance of the received information. Such technique have 
been recently explored in the context of a data reputation system [14].        
5.6 Secure positioning 
As described in Attack 3, a vehicle can cheat with its position to escape liability in an accident 
that it caused. Hence there is a need for secure position verification . In addition, vehicles or 
base stations may want to verify the position of other vehicles or base stations on-the-fly to 
ensure they are communicating with the claimed party. Although GPS [11] is a common 
positioning tool in automotive, it has security weaknesses [19]. An alternative may be 
“verifiable multilateration” [15] that works by measuring the distances from three points 
(vehicles) to a claimant (the vehicle whose position is being verified) and verifying that the 
claimed position is consistent with the measured one.  
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6. Conclusion 
The security of vehicular communications is an important component of the successful launch 
of this technology. In fact, as with other networking and especially wireless technologies, IVC 
will be the subject of many kinds of attacks with potentially fatal consequences. In this we 
have highlighted the issue by describing the various security aspects of IVC. We have 
categorized the attacker and the security threats and substantiated the different categories with 
specific attacks. We have also discussed the main challenges facing IVC security. Finally, we 
proposed a toolbox that would enable security architecture designers to choose the most 
suitable solutions to counter the previously described threats.  
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